

# Federal Railroad Administration Office of Railroad Safety Accident and Analysis Branch

Accident Investigation Report HQ-2020-1405

CSX Transportation (CSX) Rear End Collision Connersville, Indiana December 30, 2020

Note that 49 U.S.C. §20903 provides that no part of an accident or incident report, including this one, made by the Secretary of Transportation/Federal Railroad Administration under 49 U.S.C. §20902 may be used in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report.

#### SYNOPSIS

On December 30, 2020, at 4:55 p.m., EST, eastbound CSX hi-rail inspection truck was operating on the CSX Indianapolis Subdivision at Milepost (MP) BD 71.7, rear-ended a stopped train. The accident occurred in Connersville, Indiana, which is 54 miles east of Indianapolis, Indiana. The operator of the hi-rail vehicle sustained significant injuries and was taken to the hospital for treatment.

The hi-rail was operating at a recorded speed of 47 mph when the brakes were applied and the hirail impacted the rear end of stopped train Q36130. The method of train operation in this territory was Automatic Block Signal (ABS). There were no derailed train cars and the hi-rail vehicle was also not derailed.

It was dusk at the time of the derailment, and the weather was 41 °F.

The total damage is estimated at \$80,277; \$0.00 for track, signal and structures, and \$80,277 for equipment.

The Federal Railroad Administration's (FRA) investigation determined the probable cause of this accident was H402 -- motor car or on-track equipment rules, failure to comply.


U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Railroad Administration	FRA FAC	TUAL RAILR	OAD AG	PORT F	FRA File # HQ-2020-1405								
TRAIN SUMMARY													
1. Name of Railroad Opera	ting Train #1		1a. Alphab	etic Co	le 1	1b. Railroad Accident/Incident No.							
CSX Transportation			CSX		194723								
2. Name of Railroad Opera	ting Train #2		2a. Alphał	etic Co	e 2b. Railroad Accident/Incident No.								
CSX Transportation				CSX		1	194723						
GENERAL INFORMATION													
1. Name of Railroad or Other	Entity Responsib	le for Track Maintena	ance	la. Al	phabetic	Code	1b. Railroad Accident/Incident No.						
CSX Transportation				CSX			194723						
2. U.S. DOT Grade Crossing	Identification Nu	nber		3. Date 12/30		lent/Inciden	lent 4. Time of Accident/Incident 4:55 PM						
5. Type of Accident/Incident Rear End Collision													
6. Cars Carrying HAZMAT 0	7. HAZMAT Damaged/Dera	A		ars Releasin HAZMAT	g 0		9. People Evacuated 0						
10. Subdivision CSX TRANSPORTATIO	N - INDIANAP	OLIS											
11. Nearest City/Town CONNERSVILLE		12. Milepost (to n BD71.		i) 13. State IN	Abbr.	14. County FAYET	-						
• • • •	6. Visibility Dusk	-	7. Weather Rain			18. Type o Main	18. Type of Track Main						
19. Track Name/Number		20. FRA Track Class	5			21. Annual Track Density 22. Time Table Direction							
Main		Freight Trains-40,	Passenger	Trains-60 (gross 2.5			East						
23. PTC Preventable		24. Primary Cause Co	ode		25. Co	ntributing C	ause Code(s)						
No		[H402] Motor car	or on-tracl	k equipme									

U.S. Department of Transpo Federal Railroad Administra		FRA	FRA FACTUAL RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORTFRA File # HQ-2020-1405													
		-			(	OPI	ERA	ATING T	<b>RA</b>	IN #1						
1. Type of Equipment		2	. Was Equi	pment A	ttended?	d? 3. Train Number/Symbo										
Maint./Inspect. Car		Yes Hirail														
4. Speed (recorded spe if available)	eed,	I, Code 5. Trailing Tons (gross excluding power units) 6a. Remotely Co 0 = Not a remotel 1 = Remote contr									peration			-		Code
R - Recorded E - Estimated 47.0	) MPH	R 2 = Remote cont 3 = Remote cont								wer opera	ation	nore than	one remo	te control	transm	itter 0
6. Type of Territory		1 1														
Signalization:																
Signaled	<i></i>															
Method of Operation <u>N/A</u>	n/Author	ity for M	oveme	ent:												
Supplemental/Adjun <u>P</u>	ict Codes	:														
7. Principal Car/Unit	a. Initi	ial and Number b. Position in Train c. Loaded (yes/							no)		oad employ		ted for	Alcohol		Drugs
(1) First Involved (derailed, struck, etc.)	CSZ	X 094770 1						no	number that were appropriate box				in the	0		0
(2) Causing (if mechanical, cause reported)	CS2	X 094770 1					9. no					ng passengers?			No	
10. Locomotive Units	a. Head	Mid Train Rear E					nd 11. Cars				Load	led	Em	pty		
(Exclude EMU, DMU, and Cab Car Locomotives.)	End	b. Manua	al Re	c. d. d.			e. note	(Include DMU, an Car Loco				b. Pass.	c. Freight	d. Pass.		e. Caboose
(1) Total in Train	0	0		0	0	(	)	(1) Total Consist	in Eç	quipment	0	0	0	0		0
(2) Total Derailed	0	0		0 0 0				(2) Total Derailed 0					0	0		0
12. Equipment Damage 80277		onsist	13.7	Track	, Signal, V 0	Vay &	& Str	ucture Dama	ıge							
Number of Crew Members									Length of Time on Duty							
14. Engineers/Operator	rs 15. Fir	iremen 16. Conductors					17. Brakemen		18. Engineer/Operator				19. Conductor			
1		0		0			0		Hrs: 9 Mins:			55				0
Casualties to:	20. Ra Emplo				gers	22. Others 23		23. I	23. EOT Device? N/A			24. Was I	erly Armed? N/A			
Fatal		0 0				0		25. 0	Caboose (	Occupied by	Crew?	1			N/A	
Nonfatal		1			0			0								
26. Latitude         27. Longitude           39.654960000         -85.179180000																

U.S. Department of Transpo Federal Railroad Administra		FRA FACTUAL RAILROAD ACCI								<b>IDENT REPORT</b> FRA File # HQ-2020-1405								
OPERATING TRAIN #2																		
1. Type of Equipment		2	. Was Equi	pment A	ttended?	? 3. Train Number/Symbol												
Freight Train			Yes Q36130															
4. Speed (recorded speed if available)	ed,	Code			Tons (gros ower units		0 = 1	Not a remote	Controlled Locomotive? C ely controlled operation trol portable transmitter									
R - Recorded E - Estimated 0.0	MPH	$\mathbf{E}$ 11000 $2$ = Remote cont								trol tower operation trol portable transmitter - more than one remote control transmitter								
6. Type of Territory																		
Signalization: Signaled																		
Method of Operation	/Author	ity for N	lovem	ent:														
Signal Indication																		
Supplemental/Adjun		<i>:</i> :																
7. Principal Car/Unit	a. Initi	al and Number b. Position in Train c. Loaded (yes									road employ lcohol use, e		ted for	Alcoho	ol	Drugs		
(1) First Involved (derailed, struck, etc.)	TBC	DX6751	X675182 143					yes		numbe	er that were priate box		in the	0		0		
(2) Causing (if mechanical, cause reported)	TBC	DX675182 143					yes			9. Was this consist transporting passengers?					No			
10. Locomotive Units	a. Head	Mid Train Rear E					nd 11. Cars (Include EMU,			Load	led	Em	pty		•			
(Exclude EMU, DMU, and Cab Car Locomotives.)	End	b. Manu	al R			e. DMU, ar		DMU, and Cab Car Locomotives.)		a. Freight	b. Pass.	c. Freight	d. Pass.	C	e. Caboose			
(1) Total in Train	2	0		0	0	(	)	(1) Total Consist	otal in Equipmen st		66	0	77	0		0		
(2) Total Derailed	0	0		0	0	(	)	(2) Total	Derailed 0			0	0	0		0		
12. Equipment Damage This Consist   13. Track, Signal, Way & Structure Damage     0   0											1		1					
	Number of Crew Members									Length of Time on Duty								
14. Engineers/Operator	Engineers/Operators 15. Firemen 16. Conductors 1									Engineer/			19. Conductor					
1		0		1			0		Hrs: 4 Mins:			20	20 Hrs: 5 Mins: 25			25		
Casualties to:	20. Ra Emplo	U			22. Others 23. EOT Dev		COT Device? 24. W Yes				IS EOT Device Properly Arme Yes							
Fatal	Fatal 0			0			0		25.0	Caboose (	Occupied by	Crew?	rew?					
Nonfatal		0	0					0								I		
26. Latitude         27. Longitude           39.654960000         -85.179180000																		

### SKETCHES

#### Sketch - CSX Connersville



\* Not to scale

#### NARRATIVE

### **Circumstances Prior to the Accident**

The track inspector for CSX Transportation (CSX) in hi-rail vehicle 094770 (Train 1) reported for duty at 7 a.m., EST, on December 30, 2020, at the CSX Maintenance of Way office in Connersville, Indiana. Prior to reporting for this duty period, the track inspector was released from duty at 5:30 p.m., EST, on December 26, 2020. The employee received more than the statutory off-duty rest period prior to reporting. Connersville is the regular reporting location for this employee.

When the track inspector arrived at the on-duty location, he received a safety briefing and all required documentation to perform his work duties for the day. The employee performed the daily vehicle inspection prior to calling the train dispatcher to obtain a track authority at Milepost (MP) BD 67.3 that was effective at 7:33 a.m., EST.

At 7:33 a.m., EST, December 30, 2020, the track inspector, in Train 1, departed Connersville in Track Warrant Control (TWC) territory on the Indianapolis Subdivision in an eastward timetable direction. Timetable direction will be used throughout this report. Once the employee inspected the east end of his territory at the Eastbound Absolute Signal (EAS) Control Point Hamilton, he removed Train 1 from the track and released his track authority at 9:31 a.m., EST.

The inspector then drove, by road, to Indianapolis, where he received authority 80858 from the train dispatcher to hi-rail from CP IU, MP BD 123.7, in an eastward direction to MP BD 67.0 at 3:12 p.m., EST.

Line 11 of the track authority told the employee that train Q36130 (Train 2) was ahead of him at MP BD 111.5. He followed Train 2 for the next 51.7 miles before striking the rear end of the stopped Train 2 at a recorded speed of 47 mph. Maximum speed on the Indianapolis Subdivision is 60 mph for passenger trains and 40 mph for freight trains.

In this area of the railroad, the track has back-to-back curves for approximately 2 and ½ miles preceding the collision.

### The Accident

On December 30, 2020, a rear-end collision occurred in Connersville at approximately 4:55 p.m., EST. Connersville is located approximately 54 miles east of Indianapolis. The incident occurred on CSX single main track at MP BD 71.7 on the Great Lakes Division, Indianapolis Subdivision.

The rear of Eastbound Train 2 was struck by a hi-rail vehicle at MP BD 71.7; Train 2 was not in motion at the time of the incident. As a result of the collision, the employee operating the hi-rail sustained serious injuries and was transported to Reid Hospital located in Connersville for treatment. The hi-rail vehicle sustained heavy damage with no damage reported to track or Train 2 equipment. There were no injuries to the train crew.

Shortly after the incident, the Fayette County local fire, police, and emergency response personnel responded along with CSX managers to the scene of the accident.

The incident occurred on tangent track. There were severe injuries to the hi-railing employee. The hi-railing employee was post-accident drug tested under FRA authority and test results were negative.

This was single main track used for passenger service operations. This accident would not have been PTC preventable.

### **Post-Accident Investigation**

The FRA and CSX Management, along with Emergency Responders, were notified and began arriving on the scene.

#### **Analysis and Conclusions**

#### Analysis-Toxicological Testing-

The accident met the criteria for Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 219 Subpart C postaccident toxicological testing. The track inspector was tested under this authority at a local hospital. The test results for the track inspector were negative.

#### Conclusion:

Impairment of the inspector was not a causal factor in this accident.

#### Analysis-Fatigue analysis of train crew members:

FRA uses an overall effectiveness rate of 63 as the baseline for fatigue analysis. This is the level at which the risk of a human factors-related accident is calculated to be equal to chance. Any schedule that violates the overall effectiveness rate on the date of the accident or in the days leading up to the accident are considered to be at risk of fatigue contributing to the accident. The higher the Fatigue Audit InterDyne (FAID) score, the higher the fatigue exposure. Below this baseline, fatigue is not considered as probable for an employee. Software sleep settings vary according to information obtained from each employee. If an employee does not provide sleep information, FRA uses the default software settings.

#### **Conclusion:**

FRA obtained fatigue-related information, including work history, for all train operating employees involved in this accident.

FRA concluded that excessive fatigue was not present.

Information for the track inspector:

Finding: Fatigue was not probable for this employee.

#### Conclusion:

The Fatigue Avoidance Scheduling Tool (FAST) indicates that fatigue was not the probable cause for the

track inspector at the time of the accident.

## Analysis-Training and Certification Records:

The track inspector was in compliance with all required training at the time of the incident. **Conclusion**: Training and certification for the track inspector was current and not a causal factor in the incident.

### **Overall Conclusions**

CSX Train 1 was traveling at a speed of 47 mph at MP BD 71.7. This location (39.65.89.25 latitude, - 85.217200 longitude) was identified as the point of the collision.

# Probable Cause and Contributing Factors

FRA's investigation of the derailment site, and CSX records, determined there were several factors indicating the primary cause to be over speed of Train 1, which is a violation of CSX Operating Rule 712.17.

"When operating on-track equipment, operate at a speed that permits stopping within one-half the range of vision. Do not exceed the speed authorized for trains on the same track or listed in the table below, whichever is less."

"Rail-Highway vehicle less than 10,001 GVW: Forward – 40 mph."