

Federal Railroad Administration Office of Safety Headquarters Assigned Accident Investigation Report HQ-2009-02


CSX Transportation (CSX) Defiance, OH January 2, 2009

Note that 49 U.S.C. §20903 provides that no part of an accident or incident report made by the Secretary of Transportation/Federal Railroad Administration under 49 U.S.C. §20902 may be used in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report.

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DEPARTMENT FEDERAL RAILF					FRAFA	ACTUA	AL RA	ILR	ROAD AG	СС	DENT RE	PORT		I	FRA Fil	e #	HQ-200	<u>9-2</u>	
1.Name of Railroad Operating Train #1									1a. Alphabetic Code					1b. Railroad Accident/Incident No.					
CSX Transportation [CSX] 2.Name of Railroad Operating Train #2										CS			00055943						
N/A	2a. Alphabetic Code N/A					2b. Railroad Accident/Incident No. N/A													
3.Name of Railroad O N/A	3a.	. Alphabetic	c Co N/A			3b. Railroad Accident/Incident No. N/A													
4.Name of Railroad H	4a. Alphabetic Code					4b. F	4b. Railroad Accident/Incident No.												
CSX Transportatio		-	CS	Х			00055943												
5. U.S. DOT_AAR C	Brade Cro	ssing Iden	tificatio	on Nu	mber				Date of Acc onth 01		nt/Incident Day 12 Year	2009	7. T	ime of Ac 07:25		_	nt AM		РМ
8. Type of Accident/I	ndicent	1. Derail	ment		4. Side c	ollision			7. Hwy-rail crossing 10. Explosion-detonation 13. Other								Code		
(<i>single entry in code box</i>) 2. Head on collision 5. Raking collision 3. Rear end collision 6. Broken Train collision									8. RR grade crossing 11. Fire/violent rupture (describe in narrative)										
9. Cars Carrying		6. Broke				. Obstructio	n		12. Other impacts							01			
HAZMAT	10	10. HAZ Damaged		Cars Rel ZMAT	easin	N/A		12. People Evacuated				13. Divi		Chicago					
18 10								15. Milepost			16. State			1					
14. Nearest City/Tow		Defiance				(to nearest te)		Abbr (Code	17. County			ELANCE			
18. Temperature (F)		19. Visit	vility	(sin	gle entry)	Code	20. V	SI90.2	1		N/A OH		21 Tune e			DEFIANCE			Code
(specify if minus))	1.	Dawn	3.E	Dusk	code			Clear 3. Rain				21. Type of Tra- 1. Main 3.					Couc	
	, F	2.	Day	4.1	Dark	4			Cloudy 4. Fog		6.Snow 6					4. Industry			1
22. Track Name/Nu	mber						A Track ss (1-9, Σ		Code	24.	24. Annual Track Density (gross tons in			25. Time Table I 1. North		Direction h 3. East			Code
			#1 1	Main				4 (gross tons in millions) 11'							2. South	14. ^v	West		4
							OPER	AT	ING TRA	IN	#1								
26. Type of Equipme		. Freight tra				Yard/sw		Α	. Spec. MoV	WΕ	quip. Code 2	7. Was E Attend		ment (Code	28. T	'rain Nur	nber	/Symbol
Consist (single en		. Passenger . Commute				Light lo Maint./i		r			1			2. No	1		Q38	110	
29. Speed (recorded					. Method(s)		•		er code(s) t	tha	t apply)			31a. Rem	otely Co	ontrol	led Loco	mot	ive?
R - Recorded a. ATCS g. Automatic block m.Special instructions n. Other than main track												0 = Not a							
E - Estimated 44 MPH R b. Auto train control h. Currer									rame		Positive train cor			1 = Remo 2 = Remo		•			
30. Trailing Tons (gross tonnage, d. Cab j.Track v									nt control	p. (Other (Specify in	ı narrati	ve)	3 = Rem					
excluding power units) e. Traffic k. Direc 3132 f. Interlocking l.Yard li									ic control		Code(s)	<u> </u>		transmi remote	tter - mo control t			ī	
22 Dringing Con/Uni						2			ad(()	Ι.	e N/A N/A			1.6 1					0
32. Principal Car/Unit a. Initial and Number b. Position in Train (1) First involved								Loau	ed(yes/no)	- 3.	 If railroad emp enter the num 						Alcohol		Drugs
(derailed, struck, e	etc)	CS	XT 836	57		1			yes		the appropriate box.						N/A		N/A
(2) Causing (if med		l	0			0		ľ	N/A		34. Was this con	sist trans	porti	ng passen	gers? (Y	'/N)		I	N
cause reported		a. Head		Mid '	Frain	R	ear End		36. Cars					aded		Emp	ty	-	
		End	b. Ma			d. Manu	al c. Rei	mote					ight	b. Pass.	c. Frei	ght c	l. Pass.	e. (Caboose
(1) Total in Train	n	2		0	0	0	0		(1) Total	in E	Equipment Consi	st	7	0	65		0		0
(2) Total Deraile		2		0	0	0	0		(2) Total	Der	ailed	:	5	0	23		0		0
37. Equipment Dama	-			38. Tra	ack, Signal, V	Way,			39. Prima	ary (Cause			40. Cont	ributing	Caus	e		
This Consist		\$949,386.00	1		ucture Dama	ge	\$95,000.	00	Code		,	Г111	1 67	Code			1	N/A	
41. Engineer/	42. Fir	Numbe	rorCr		onductors	44. Bi	akemen	45. Engineer/Operator					n or 1	f Time on Duty 46. Conductor					
Operators 1		0			1		0		ê î			Mi 50					50		
Casualties to:	1 0 1					s 49.	Other		50. EOT Device?				51. Was EOT Device Properly Arm			ned?			
Fatal		0 0				0			1. Yes 2. No 1					1. Yes 2. No 1					
									52. Caboose Occupied by Crew?			ew?	1						
Nonfatal		0			0		0				1. Yes	2.	No						N/A
						0	PERA	ΓIN	G TRAIN	[#2									
53. Type of Equipme	int	Freight tra Passenger				Yard/sw Light loo	-	A.	Spec. MoW	νE	quip. Code 54	 Was E Attend 		ment C	ode	55. T	rain Nun	nber/	Symbol
Consist (single en		0			t of cars 9.	0		r			N/A			2. No 1	N/A		N	Ά	
56. Speed (recorded					. Method(s)				er code(s) t	tha				58a. Rem		ontrol	led Loco	mot	ive?
R - Recorded		1		a	. ATCS o. Auto train o		g. Autom				Special instructio			0 = Not a remotely controlled 1 = Remote control portable					
E - Estimated	N/A	MPH	N/A	1	. Auto train (CONTROL	Curren	n of t	ame	п. (Other than main t	TACK		I = Kem	oue cont	ioi po	ntable		

DEPARTMENT FEDERAL RAILF					FRA FA	CTUAL	RAILR	OAD AC	CIDENT REP	ORT	F	RA File	# <u>HQ-200</u>)9-2		
57. Trailing Tons (gr excluding powe	e, N/A		d. e.	Auto train Cab Traffic	j.Ti k. l	rack warran Direct traffi	t control 1	c control Code(s)				2 = Remote control tower 3 = Remote control transmitter - more than one remote control transmitter				
					Interlocking		ard limits		N/A N/A N/A	1		N/A				
59. Principal Car/Unit a. Initial and Nut			umber	mber b. Position in Train			led(yes/no)	60. If railroad emp enter the numb		ted for drug/alcohol use, e positive in Alcohol			Drugs			
(1) First involved (derailed, struck, etc) N/A				N/.	A	N	N/A	the appropriate box.			N/A					
(2) Causing (if mechanical cause reported) N/A				N/.	A	1	N/A	61. Was this const	ist transport	ting passengers? (Y/N)			N/A			
			Mid T anual ₁	rain c. Remote		r End c. Remote	63. Cars		Lo a. Freight	aded b. Pass.		Empty ht d. Pass.	e. Caboos			
(1) Total in Train		N/A	1	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	(1) Total in	n Equipment Consist	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		
(2) Total Derailed N/A			N	//A	N/A N/A		N/A	(2) Total I) Total Derailed N/A			N/A	N/A	N/A		
64. Equipment Dam This Consist	age	XY (A			. Track, Signal, Way,			66. Prima Code		N/A	67. Contributing Cause Code					
		N/A Numbe	r of Ci		ructure Dam	age	N/A	Code	Time on D	utv		N/A				
68. Engineer/	69. Fire				nductors	71. Brak	71. Brakemen		eer/Operator	8	73. Cond					
Operators N/		N/A			N/A		N/A		Hrs N/A Mi			Hrs				
Casualties to:	74. Railro	oad Emplo	oyees ?	75. Trai	n Passengers	5 76. Othe	er	77. EOT Device? 1. Yes 2. No 1 N/A				EOT Dev Yes	vice Properly 2. No			
Fatal		N/A			N/A	1	N/A			N/A	1.	N/A				
Nonfatal		N/A			N/A	1	N/A		79. Caboose Occupied by Crew? 1. Yes 2. No				1			
						OI	PERATIN	G TRAIN	1 #3							
	80. Type of Equipment 1. Freight train 4. Work train 7. Yard/switching A. Consist (single entry) 2. Passenger train 5. Single car 8. Light loco(s). 3. Commuter train 6. Cut of cars 9. Maint./inspect.car								. Spec. MoW Equip. Code 81. Was Equipment Code Attended? 82. Train Number/Symbol N/A 1. Yes 2. No N/A N/A							
83. Speed (recorded					Method(s) of			r code(s) th	nat apply)		85a. Remo	otely Cor	ntrolled Loco	omotive?		
R - Recorded	a. ATCS g. Hatomate							NOCK	n.Special instructions				controlled			
	E - Estimated N/A MPH 0 b. Auto train control h. Current of t c. Auto train stop i. Time table/t								 Positive train contr 		1 = Remo 2 = Remo		ol portable ol tower			
84. Trailing Tons (gross tonnage, avaluding power units) d. Cab j.Track warrant cont									b. Other (Specify in r	arrative)	3 = Remo					
excluding powe	N/A			Traffic Interlocking		Direct traffi ard limits	c control	Code(s)	N/A N/A	remote c		e than one ansmitter	N/A			
86. Principal Car/Un	a. Initial	and N		-	on in Train	c Load	ed(()			. 1 6 1	/-111					
(1) First involved	n	a. muai		unioer				led(yes/no)	87. If railroad empl enter the numb				Alcoho	Drugs		
(derailed, struck, etc) 0					0		N/A	the appropriate	box.			N/A	N/A			
(2) Causing (if me cause reported			0)		N/A	88. Was this const	ist transport	ing passen	gers? (Y	/N)	N/A		
89. Locomotive Uni	its	a. Head		Mid T			r End c. Remote	90. Cars		Lo a. Freight	aded		Empty ht d. Pass.	e. Caboose		
(1) Total in Trai	n	End 0	b. Ma	anual 0	c. Remote	0. Manual	c. Remote		Equipment Consist	0	0. Fass.	0	0	0		
(2) Total Deraile	ed	0		0	0	0	0	(2) Total I	Derailed	0	0	0	0	0		
91. Equipment Dam	age		-	92. Tra	ck, Signal, W	Vay,		93. Primary Cause Code 94. Contributing C						1		
This Consist	\$0.00			ructure Dama	age	\$0.00	N/A Code N/A									
95. Engineer/	96. Fire	Numbe	r of Ci		onductors	98. Brak	emen	Length of Time on Duty 99. Engineer/Operator 100. Conductor								
Operators 0	90. File	0		1.0	0		0		Hrs 0 M	i 0	100. Con	Hrs	s 0	Mi 0		
Casualties to:	101. Rail	road Emp	loyees	102.	Train	103. Oth	ier	104. EOT			105. Was	EOT D	evice Proper	ly		
Fatal		0			0		0	1. Yes 2. No N/A				Yes	2. No	N/A		
Nonfatal	Nonfatal 0				0		0	106. Caboose Occupied by Crew? 1. Yes 2. No						N/A		
Highway User Involved										Equipmen	t Involved	1				
107.							Code	111. Equi	oment					Code		
C. Truck- A. Auto D. Pick-U	Frailer. F	. Bus J. School	J Bus F	. Other K. Pede	Motor Vehic strian	cle	Code	1.Train(un	3.Train its pulling) 4.Car(s)	(standing)	6.Light l 7.Light(s	Loco(s)	(moving) ina)	Loui		
B. Truck E. Van	H				r (spec. in n	arrative)	N/A	2.Train(un	1.Train(units pulling) 4.Car(s)(moving) 7.Light(s) (standing) 2.Train(units pushing) 5.Car(s)(standing) 8.Other (specify in narrative)) N/A		
108. Vehicle Speed (est. MPH at in		N/A	109. 1 Nor	th ୨ፍ	<i>geographic</i> outh 3.East		Code N/A	112. Position of Car Unit in N/A								
(con 111 11 ul th	Turi)	1			J.Last			1								

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FRA FACTUAL RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT FRA File # HQ-2009-2 FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION FRA FACTUAL RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT FRA File # HQ-2009-2													
110. Position													Code
1.Stalled on Crossing 2.Stopped on Crossing 3.Moving Over Crossing 1. Rail Equipment Struck Highway User 4. Trapped N/A												N/A	
	e highway user		•	•			Code	114b. Wa	is there a haza	rdous materials	release		Code
in the impact transporting hazardous materials? 1. Highway User 2. Rail Equipment 3. Both 4. Neither N/A 1. Highway User 2. Rail Equipment 3. Both 4. Neither											N/A		
1. Highway User 2. Rail Equipment 3. Both 4. Neither 10.1 Horganay and Linna Equipment 1. End and the second secon												<u> </u>	
N/A													
115. Type 1.Gates 4.Wig Wags 7.Crossbucks 10.Flagged by crew 116. Signaled Crossing Code 117. Whistle Ban												Code	
Crossing 2.Cantilever FLS 5.Hwy. traffic signals 8.Stop signs 11.Other (spec. in narr.) (See instructions for codes) 1. Yes													
Code(s)	3. Unknown									3. Unknown	N/A		
												by Street	Code
118. Location 1. Both Sid	0				Code		with Highway Signals			Lights o	Code		
	Vehicle Approa	ach					1. Yes			1. Y			
	e Side of Vehic		ach		N/A		2. No	N/A				N/A	
									101 5		iknown		
121.	122. Driver's	Gender	Code				or in Front of	Code		er e around or thru	the Gate	4. Stopped on Crossing	Code
Age	1. Male			1		r was Struc 2. No	k by Second			bed and then Pro		5. Other (specify in	
N/A										(1 57	N/A		
125. Driver Pa	ssed	Cod	e 12	6. Vie	w of Track C	bscured by	(primary ob	struction)					Code
Highway V		1			ermanent Str			ng Train 5.	0	7. Other	(specify in	narrative)	1
1. Yes 2. No	3. Unknown	N/.	A	2. S	tanding Railı	oad Equipr	nent 4. Topo	graphy 6.	Highway Veh	cle 8. Not ob	structed		N/A
Casualties	to:		Kill	ed	Injured	127. Driv			Cod		s Driver in t	ne Vehicle?	Code
							d 2.Injured 3.	5	N/2	1.	1. Yes 2. No		
129. Highway-Rail Crossing Users N/A N/A ¹							hway Vehicle dollar damag		y Damage N/A 131. Total Number of Highway-Rail C (include driver) N				
132. Locomot	ive Auxiliary L	ights?					Code	133. Locoi	notive Auxilia	ry Lights Opera	ational?		Code
1. Y	es	2.	No				N/A 1. Yes 2. No				N/A		
134. Locomot	ive Headlight I	lluminat	ed?				Code	135. Locoi	notive Audibl	e Warning Sour	ided?		Code
1. Yes 2. No N/A 1. Yes 2. No										N/A			



136. DRAW A SKETCH OF ACCIDENT AREA INCLUDING ALL TRACKS, SIGNALS, SWITCHES, STRUCTURES, OBJECTS, ETC., INVOLVED.

137. SYNOPSIS OF THE ACCIDENT

A westbound CSX freight train derailed on the Main Track at approximately 7:25 a.m, EST, January 12, 2009. The derailment occurred on the CSX Chicago Division, Garrett Subdivision on No. 1 Main Track at CSX milepost BI90.2. The derailment occurred in a rural farming area between the communities of Defiance, OH and Sherwood, OH in Defiance County. There were no injuries sustained by the train crew and no spill of hazardous materials.

Locomotive damage was assessed at \$1400 with rail car damage set at \$947,986 and track damage amounting to \$95,000. No signal damage occurred.

FRA Post Accident Testing of employees was not applicable in this accident.

At the time of the accident, the train was traveling at 44 miles per hour. It was dark and foggy with approximately one inch of snow on the ground. The temperature was 19 degrees Fahrenheit and the wind speed was 0 mph.

The accident was caused by a lack of proper rail securement around a joint and beyond in the general area of Milepost BI90.2; the Cause Code is T111 - Wide Gage (spikes or other rail fasteners).

138. NARRATIVE

CIRCUMSTANCES PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT

TRAIN CSX Q381-10 WEST

The crew on westward Train CSX Q381-10 consisted of a locomotive engineer and a conductor. The crew first went on duty at 2:35 a.m. EST, January 12, 2009, at the CSX Willard Terminal in Willard, OH. This is the home terminal for the crew members and both received more than the required statutory off-duty rest period prior to reporting for duty. Prior to reporting for duty, the engineer had a rest period of 44 hours and 41 minutes. The conductor was off on rest for 38 hours and 45 minutes. The engineer has 32 years of railroad experience with 15 years being in engine service. During the interview process, the engineer had her engineer certificate available and it was up-to-date. The conductor has 5 years of rail service.

CSX Train Q381-10 was a mixed freight train consisting of two locomotives, 7 loaded rail cars, and 65 empty rail cars. CSX Train Q381-10 was 4,583 feet in length with 3,132 trailing tons. Eighteen railcars contained hazardous materials. This train was originally the pick-up of an inbound train. However, the inbound crew reported experiencing problems east of Willard, OH. As a result, the inbound cars on CSX Train Q381-10 were held at Willard Terminal. After the outbound crew completed a new class 1 air brake test, an initial terminal inspection was performed. The rear-end portion of the two-way end-of-train device (EOTD) was also tested and armed at Willard Terminal. The crew of westward CSX Train Q381-10 departed Willard Terminal at 4:34 a.m. with the two locomotives arriving on inbound Q381-10 handling a 72 car train built at Willard Terminal.

As the westbound train approached the accident area, the locomotive engineer was seated at the controls on the north side of the leading the locomotive. The conductor was seated on the south side of the leading locomotive. The train was traveling at 44 miles per hour. The maximum authorized speed is 50 mph as designated in the current CSX Timetable No. 2.

In this area of the railroad, there is tangent track followed by a 1-degree curve to the right of about 700 feet to

the point of derailment (POD) at exit (west spiral) of curve. Traveling east to west, the grade is practically level.

The railroad timetable direction of the train is west. The geographic direction is west. Timetable directions are used throughout this report.

THE ACCIDENT

CSX Train Q381-10 was operating westbound negotiating the exit (west) end spiral of a 1-degree right hand curve at milepost BI90.2. The crew stated they felt the locomotive dip and sway. Next, the crew stated the train experienced an undesired emergency application of the train air brake system. According to the engineer, she looked into the side mirror of the lead locomotive and observed cars derailing accompanied by sparks and fire. After the train stopped, the crew members announced emergency over the radio and contacted the dispatcher to report the derailment.

In the aftermath of the derailment, the two locomotives and six head cars remained coupled with the lead locomotive stopping approximately 990 feet east of the general pile up of 24 derailed, blocking Main Tracks 1 and 2.

CAR DAMAGE

Twenty three loaded rail cars and five empty cars derailed. Ten of sixteen residue tank cars derailed in positions 10-19 from the head end. Two of these derailed tank cars were breached. Damage to rail cars totaled \$947,986.

LOCOMOTIVE DAMAGE

The lead locomotive, CSXT 8367, was built by Electro-Motive Division in 1970, a designated Model SD40-2. The trailing locomotive, CSXT 8566, was built by Electro-Motive Division in 1984, a designated Model SD50. Both locomotives are equipped with three axle trucks so designed that the entire weight of the locomotives is concentrated directly over the center axles of the trucks. Both locomotives derailed. Wheel RL 6 was derailed on lead locomotive CSXT 8367 and wheels RL 123456 were derailed on trailing locomotive CSXT 8367 was \$200 and \$1200 was the amount assessed for damage to CSXT 8566.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

ANALYSIS - LOCOMOTIVE INSPECTION

An inspection of CSXT 8367 and CSXT 8566 was conducted by an FRA Motive Power & Equipment Safety Inspector (MP&E) and CSXT Mechanical Department personnel. No mechanical defects or conditions that could have caused the derailment were discovered. The automatic and independent air brakes on both locomotives were applied and released properly during testing. Reviews of the 92-day locomotive inspection documents and the daily locomotive inspection documents were current.

CONCLUSION - The locomotives condition was not a factor in this accident.

ANALYSIS - OPERATING RULES & TRAINING

Carrier records indicate that the engineer and conductor on CSX Train Q381-10 received the following training in 2008: Operating Rules, Safety-Red Zone, Securing Equipment, Power Brake Law, Hazardous-Materials, Operation Hydration-Summer Spike and Severe Winter Weather Training. Locomotive engineer certificates, hearing & vision testing, driver license checks, and other training were in compliance with 49CFR Rule 240.

CONCLUSION - Operating Rules and training were not a factor in the accident.

EMPLOYEE WORK RECORDS & DISCIPLINE

A review of Carrier records reflects the engineer on CSX Train Q381-10 has 32 years of service with 15 years being in engine service. There are four incidents of discipline in this engineer's file beginning May 6, 2001. The conductor has 5 years of service with no discipline noted in his record.

EFFECIENCY TESTING

A review of 57 efficiency tests conducted involving the locomotive engineer of CSX Train Q381-10 between January 4, 2008, and December 20, 2008, indicate one rule infraction - General Rule A-1. Reviews of 22 efficiency tests conducted on the conductor of CSX Train Q381-10 for the same time period indicate no rule infractions.

EFFECIENCY TESTING IN THE VICINITY OF THE DERAILMENT

A review of efficiency tests conducted by CSX supervisors between milepost BI85 and BI95 for the time period March 21, 2008, and December 6, 2008, indicate no rules infractions noted.

Trains operate on this section of railroad under CSX operating rules. The method of operation is Automatic Traffic Control System (ATCS). Authority for main track movement is governed by NORAC Rule 261. Cab Signal System Rules and General Signal Rules are also in effect.

Trains operate on signal indication and the maximum authorized speed for regular freight trains is 60 mph. Current CSX Equipment Handling Rules, effective October 1, 2007, has a restriction of 50 mph for freight trains handling one or more empty cars, except solid intermodal trains with empty TOFC/COFC and multilevel auto rack cars. Equipment Handling Rules also restrict a 50 mile per hour maximum speed for Unit Trains (solid loaded unit trains of coal, coke, grain, or minerals).

ANALYSIS - LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEER OPERATING PERFORMANCE

The lead locomotive on CSX Train Q381-10 was equipped with a speed indicator and an event recorder as required by Federal regulations. The relevant event recorder data was downloaded and analyzed by the CSX Roadmaster at the accident site. Event recordings documented that the locomotive throttle of CSX Train Q381-10 was in Run-6 position at the time of the derailment and was moving at a speed of 44 mph. The maximum authorized speed for CSX Train Q381-10 was 50 mph. The independent and automatic brakes were released and all functions of the two-way EOTD were operational. The dynamic brake was not in use.

CONCLUSION

Locomotive Engineer performance was not a factor in the accident.

ANALYSIS - FATIGUE

FRA obtained fatigue related information, including a 10-day work history, for the two crew members on CSX Train Q381-10 involved in this accident.

CONCLUSION

Fatigue was not evident for either of the crew members.

ANALYSIS - TOXICOLOGY TESTING

The train crew was not tested because the initial estimated cost of damage was less than \$1,000,000. Also, the initial evidence at the accident scene did not indicate the actions of the train crew contributed to the accident

CONCLUSION

Drugs and alcohol were not a factor.

ANALYSIS - SIGNALS

The last signal that CSX Train Q381-10 passed prior to the derailment was the 903-1 Intermediate Signal located on the north side of Main Track No. 1 at milepost BI90.2 and approximately eight car lengths east of the derailment site. This signal location has back-to-back Safetran CLS 20 color-light signals controlled by GE Harmon ECIV Plus. The most restricting aspect the 903-1 signal can display is restricting. There are three intermediate signal locations between Defiance and the Sherwood Control Point. They have Safetran CLS 20 signals controlled by ECIV+ with coded DC track circuits.

CONCLUSION

Signals were not a contributing factor in the derailment. FRA reviewed the signal test records and conducted on-site signal testing. There was no signal damage as a result of the derailment or subsequent cleanup and track repair.

ANALYSIS - SIGNAL SYSTEM

The signal system on the Garrett Subdivision from Defiance through Sherwood, OH uses Safetran Model CLS 20 color-light type signals. Union Switch and Signal (US&S) Model M23 power switch machines, and are operated via data radio by a train dispatcher in Chicago, IL. The signals are controlled by General Electric Harmon Vital Logic Controller (VHLC) technology and General Railway Signal (GRS) plug-in-style relays. Track continuity is checked and trains are detected using GE Harmon Electro code IV+ (ECIV) coded DC track circuits between signal locations and DC track circuits within the limits of the control points. There are several hand throw switches in the area using a combination of US&S T21 or New Century type switches and General Railway Signal (GRS) Model 9 electric locks, US&S or GRS circuit controllers, and Hayes derails.

CONCLUSION

No exceptions were taken for the operation of the signal system. FRA inspections of the signal system were performed on January 14, 2009. The event log from the control machine in Chicago was reviewed and indicated that CSX Train Q381-10 received a clear signal indication at signal 903.1 All FRA testing was in compliance. The signal system operated as intended.

ANALYSIS - HOT BOX DETECTORS

Hot box detector records for CSX Train Q381-10 were reviewed and did not indicate any defects for the train.

CONCLUSION

Hot box or hot roller bearings were not a contributing factor in the derailment.

TRACK GRADE & CURVATURE PRECEDING DERAILMENT SITE

The Garrett Subdivision is tangent track with mostly 0.0% grade westward between MP BI88.2 and BI90. There is a 1-degree 15 minute right hand curve at MP BI88.2 and a 1-degree right hand curve at MP BI90.2.

ANALYSIS - TRACK INSPECTION RECORDS

A review of Carrier track inspections conducted between October 13, 2008, and January 8, 2009, revealed no major defects repaired in the immediate vicinity of the derailment other than the plant weld repaired on November 18, 2008.

A review of Carrier CWR walking joint bar inspection report reflects a total of 14 joints were inspected on Main Track #1 between mileposts BI85.1 and BI97.3 on December 29, 2008, with no exceptions noted.

There were six FRA track inspections conducted on the Garret Subdivision between March 13, 2008 and

December 10, 2008. Two of these inspections were over the subject Main Track #1 between mileposts BI87 and BI110 with no major exceptions taken.

CONCLUSION - The frequency of the track inspections and the accompanying records were not a factor in this accident.

ANALYSIS - Track - The derailment occurred on 122# curve cut rail (Bethlehem Lackawanna-rolled April 1975) in a 1-degree right hand curve with 1-1/2 inches of super elevation. Both south and north rails were seated in 14 ½ inches by 7 3/4 inches double shouldered tie plates. The point of derailment occurred on the south rail at joint bars measuring 36 inches. These joint bars connected the west end of a 29 foot installed plug rail to the parent rail. The rail plug was installed on November 18, 2008 as a result of a defective plant weld detected during a Sperry Ultra-sonic Rail test on November 18, 2008.

The joint bars were drilled with six holes; however, the joint bars were secured to the rail ends with only four bolts as the rail ends were not drilled for the two middle holes in the joint bars. The joint bar on the field side was in good condition; however, the gage side joint bar showed signs of wear on the top (west end) of the joint bar.

The anchor pattern consisted of every other tie box anchored using a standard spring type anchor. The anchors were flush against the crossties.

An on-site investigation revealed missing spikes in and beyond the area of the aforementioned joint at Milepost BI90.2. There were no spikes holding the rail down on the field side of the joint. There were no spikes holding the rail down in the immediate area of the joint on the field side. There were no spikes holding the rail on the gage side of the subject joint. The only spikes present were the anchor spikes holding the tie plate to the crosstie.

The spiking pattern required on this 60 mph Class 4 track is Spiking Pattern "C" as indicated in CSXT Engineering Department Maintenance of Way Field Manual issued November 4, 2008. This spiking pattern requires two rail holding spikes on the gage side and one rail holding spike on the gage side with one anchor spike on the field side of both the high and low side of the curve. The anchor pattern consisted of every other tie box anchored using a standard spring type anchor.

It is noted that the existence of raised track spikes (three inches) on the gage side of the north rail on Main Track #1 were observed for a distance of 450 feet ahead of the point where the lead locomotive of CSX Train Q381-10 stopped. During the on-ground inspection, these raised spikes and damage to a 36 inch joint bar (gage side) on the north rail ahead of the lead locomotive on the train initially indicated that a locomotive or rail car in the preceding westbound CSX Unit Coal Train U994-09 had derailed and then re-railed itself at the joint bar prior to the arrival of CSX Train Q381-10. As a result, CSX Train U994-09 was stopped at Gary, Indiana on the date of the incident for a detailed inspection. The inspection of CSX Train U994-09, which involved CSX Mechanical personnel and a FRA MP&E Inspector, revealed no derailment damage or derailment marks on any equipment.

CSX investigators string lined the 1-degree curve and took measurements at 15 ½ foot stations. The maximum gage measurement within 13 stations was 57 inches. The maximum elevation was 1-1/2 inches. However, at the point of derailment (PD) where the high side rail was rolled (canted) 1-1/4 inches, plus 1 inch shove to the field (south) side, the gage measured 58 ½ inches.

The point of derailment for CSX Train Q381-10 was at the south rail on the No. 1 Main Track at the rail joint bars connecting the west end of a 29 foot installed plug rail to the parent rail. This plug rail was installed on November 18, 2008 as a result of a defective plant weld detected during a Sperry Ultra-sonic Rail test on November 18, 2008. During the on-site investigation, it was determined that there were missing spikes in and beyond the area of the aforementioned joint at milepost BI90.2. The only spikes present were the anchor spikes holding the tie plate to the crosstie.

CONCLUSION - Defective track conditions were a cause of this accident due to the missing spikes found on the field side of the rail joint at milepost 190.2 at the accident scene. The missing rail spikes on the field side of the rail coupled with missing rail holding spikes on the gauge side of the joint caused the rail to spread under load conditions. The gauge was measured at the PD at 58-1/2 inches.

ANALYSIS & CONCLUSION

While traveling west on Main Track #1 between Defiance and Sherwood, OH, CSX Train Q381-10 experienced an undesired emergency application of the train air brake system resulting in the derailment of two locomotives and 28 rail cars. An investigation revealed several missing track spikes in and beyond the area of a joint on the high side of a curve at milepost BI90.2. Wheel action at the point of derailment indicated a drop inside the gage of the track, which supports the notion of wide gage.

Four westbound trains ahead of CSX Train Q381-10 operated over the derailment site between the hours of 2:45 a.m. and 6:10 a.m. on January 12, 2009 without experiencing any problems. There were fresh rail marks and a gouge in a rail joint on the north rail approximately 450 feet west of the lead locomotive of CSX Train Q381-10. However, there were no wheel flange marks on the cross ties, tie plates or rail anchors to indicate that a freight car had been derailed in a preceding train. If a locomotive or freight car had been derailed, there would be visible markings on the cross ties, tie plates and/or rail anchors.

An inspection of the last preceding westbound train (CSX Train U994-09) was conducted at the CSX Yard in Gary, IN. No derailment damage or marks were found on any equipment in CSX Train U994-09 during the inspection which involved CSX Mechanical personnel and a FRA MP&E Inspector out of Chicago, IL. During this inspection, an empty coal car (CEFX 69765) was removed from CSX Train U994-09 and taken to CSX Barr Yard Car Shop in Chicago, IL for further inspection because a wheel flange on the car showed excessive wear. There were no defective or unusual conditions found during the inspection of this car.

The train crew of CSX Train U909-04 was interviewed by CSX personnel in Gary, IN. They acknowledged that the track conditions at the point of derailment of CSX Train Q381-10 felt rough, but not significant enough to warrant notification to the train dispatcher.

The CSX Division Engineer expressed belief that a freight car in another westbound train had previously derailed and damaged the track in the accident area, which caused the derailment of CSX Train Q381-10: however, he conceded that there was no evidence found during inspections to support his theory.

PROBABLE CAUSE AND CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

FRA's investigation concludes that the cause of derailment of CSX Train Q381-10 was wide gage.