



***Federal Railroad Administration
Office of Safety
Headquarters Assigned
Accident Investigation Report
HQ-2008-26***


***Union Pacific (UP)
Fairfield, NE
March 7, 2008***

Note that 49 U.S.C. §20903 provides that no part of an accident or incident report made by the Secretary of Transportation/Federal Railroad Administration under 49 U.S.C. §20902 may be used in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION		FRA FACTUAL RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT				FRA File # <u>HQ-2008-26</u>					
1. Name of Railroad Operating Train #1 Union Pacific RR Co. [UP]			1a. Alphabetic Code UP		1b. Railroad Accident/Incident No. 0308NP002						
2. Name of Railroad Operating Train #2 N/A			2a. Alphabetic Code N/A		2b. Railroad Accident/Incident No. N/A						
3. Name of Railroad Operating Train #3 N/A			3a. Alphabetic Code N/A		3b. Railroad Accident/Incident No. N/A						
4. Name of Railroad Responsible for Track Maintenance: Union Pacific RR Co. [UP]			4a. Alphabetic Code UP		4b. Railroad Accident/Incident No. 0308NP002						
5. U.S. DOT_AAR Grade Crossing Identification Number			6. Date of Accident/Incident Month 03 Day 06 Year 2008		7. Time of Accident/Incident 11:54: <input type="checkbox"/> AM <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PM						
8. Type of Accident/Indicent (single entry in code box)			1. Derailment 2. Head on collision 3. Rear end collision		4. Side collision 5. Raking collision 6. Broken Train collision		7. Hwy-rail crossing 8. RR grade crossing 9. Obstruction				
					10. Explosion-detonation 11. Fire/violent rupture 12. Other impacts		13. Other (describe in narrative)				
							Code 01				
9. Cars Carrying HAZMAT 0		10. HAZMAT Cars Damaged/Derailed N/A		11. Cars Releasing HAZMAT N/A		12. People Evacuated 0		13. Division North Platte			
14. Nearest City/Town Fairfield			15. Milepost (to nearest tenth) 247.7		16. State Abbr Code N/A NE		17. County CLAY				
18. Temperature (F) (specify if minus) 19 F		19. Visibility (single entry) 1. Dawn 3. Dusk 2. Day 4. Dark		20. Weather (single entry) 1. Clear 3. Rain 5. Sleet 2. Cloudy 4. Fog 6. Snow		21. Type of Track 1. Main 3. Siding 2. Yard 4. Industry		Code 1			
22. Track Name/Number Main Track No 2			23. FRA Track Class (1-9, X) 4		24. Annual Track Density (gross tons in millions) 178		25. Time Table Direction 1. North 3. East 2. South 4. West 3				
OPERATING TRAIN #1											
26. Type of Equipment Consist (single entry)		1. Freight train 2. Passenger train 3. Commuter train		4. Work train 5. Single car 6. Cut of cars		7. Yard/switching 8. Light loco(s). 9. Maint./inspect.car		A. Spec. MoW Equip. Code 1			
						27. Was Equipment Attended? 1. Yes 2. No 1		28. Train Number/Symbol CBTLU905			
29. Speed (recorded speed, if available) Code R - Recorded E - Estimated 43 MPH R			31. Method(s) of Operation (enter code(s) that apply) a. ATCS g. Automatic block m. Special instructions b. Auto train control h. Current of traffic n. Other than main track c. Auto train stop i. Time table/train orders o. Positive train control d. Cab j. Track warrant control p. Other (Specify in narrative) e. Traffic k. Direct traffic control Code(s) f. Interlocking l. Yard limits				31a. Remotely Controlled Locomotive? 0 = Not a remotely controlled 1 = Remote control portable 2 = Remote control tower 3 = Remote control transmitter - more than one remote control transmitter 0				
30. Trailing Tons (gross tonnage, excluding power units) 15510			d		e		N/A		N/A		
32. Principal Car/Unit		a. Initial and Number		b. Position in Train		c. Loaded (yes/no)		33. If railroad employee(s) tested for drug/alcohol use, enter the number that were positive in the appropriate box.			
(1) First involved (derailed, struck, etc)		UP48850		30		yes		Alcohol 0		Drugs 0	
(2) Causing (if mechanical cause reported)		0		0		N/A		34. Was this consist transporting passengers? (Y/N) N			
35. Locomotive Units		a. Head End		Mid Train b. Manual c. Remote		Rear End d. Manual c. Remote		36. Cars		Loaded a. Freight b. Pass. c. Freight d. Pass. e. Caboose	
(1) Total in Train		2		0 0		0 1		(1) Total in Equipment Consist		110 0 0 0 0	
(2) Total Derailed		0		0 0		0 0		(2) Total Derailed		38 0 0 0 0	
37. Equipment Damage This Consist \$1,887,315.00			38. Track, Signal, Way, & Structure Damage \$149,428.00			39. Primary Cause Code T214			40. Contributing Cause Code N/A		
Number of Crew Members						Length of Time on Duty					
41. Engineer/ Operators 1		42. Firemen 0		43. Conductors 1		44. Brakemen 0		45. Engineer/Operator Hrs 5 Mi 53		46. Conductor Hrs 5 Mi 53	
Casualties to:		47. Railroad Employees		48. Train Passengers		49. Other		50. EOT Device? 1. Yes 2. No 1		51. Was EOT Device Properly Armed? 1. Yes 2. No 1	
Fatal		0		0		0					
Nonfatal		0		0		0		52. Caboose Occupied by Crew? 1. Yes 2. No N/A			
OPERATING TRAIN #2											
53. Type of Equipment Consist (single entry)		1. Freight train 2. Passenger train 3. Commuter train		4. Work train 5. Single car 6. Cut of cars		7. Yard/switching 8. Light loco(s). 9. Maint./inspect.car		A. Spec. MoW Equip. Code N/A		54. Was Equipment Attended? 1. Yes 2. No N/A	
										55. Train Number/Symbol N/A	
56. Speed (recorded speed, if available) Code R - Recorded E - Estimated N/A MPH N/A			58. Method(s) of Operation (enter code(s) that apply) a. ATCS g. Automatic block m. Special instructions b. Auto train control h. Current of traffic n. Other than main track				58a. Remotely Controlled Locomotive? 0 = Not a remotely controlled 1 = Remote control portable				

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION		FRA FACTUAL RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT				FRA File # <u>HQ-2008-26</u>	
110. Position 1. Stalled on Crossing 2. Stopped on Crossing 3. Moving Over Crossing 4. Trapped				Code N/A			
113. Circumstance 1. Rail Equipment Struck Highway User 2. Rail Equipment Struck by Highway User				Code N/A			
114a. Was the highway user and/or rail equipment involved in the impact transporting hazardous materials? 1. Highway User 2. Rail Equipment 3. Both 4. Neither				Code N/A			
114b. Was there a hazardous materials release 1. Highway User 2. Rail Equipment 3. Both 4. Neither				Code N/A			
114c. State here the name and quantity of the hazardous materials released, if any. N/A							
115. Type 1. Gates 4. Wig Wags 7. Crossbucks 10. Flagged by crew Crossing 2. Cantilever FLS 5. Hwy. traffic signals 8. Stop signs 11. Other (spec. in narr.) Warning 3. Standard FLS 6. Audible 9. Watchman 12. None				116. Signaled Crossing (See instructions for codes)		117. Whistle Ban	
Code(s)				N/A		Code N/A	
118. Location of Warning 1. Both Sides 2. Side of Vehicle Approach 3. Opposite Side of Vehicle Approach				Code N/A		119. Crossing Warning with Highway Signals 1. Yes 2. No 3. Unknown	
120. Crossing Illuminated by Street Lights or Special Lights 1. Yes 2. No 3. Unknown				Code N/A		Code N/A	
121. Age N/A		122. Driver's Gender 1. Male 2. Female		Code N/A		123. Driver Drove Behind or in Front of and Struck or was Struck by Second Train 1. Yes 2. No 3. Unknown	
124. Driver 1. Drove around or thru the Gate 2. Stopped and then Proceeded 3. Did not Stop		4. Stopped on Crossing 5. Other (specify in narrative)		Code N/A		Code N/A	
125. Driver Passed Highway Vehicle 1. Yes 2. No 3. Unknown		Code N/A		126. View of Track Obscured by (primary obstruction) 1. Permanent Structure 3. Passing Train 5. Vegetation 7. Other (specify in narrative) 2. Standing Railroad Equipment 4. Topography 6. Highway Vehicle 8. Not obstructed			
Casualties to:		Killed		Injured		127. Driver 1. Killed 2. Injured 3. Uninjured	
128. Was Driver in the Vehicle? 1. Yes 2. No		Code N/A		Code N/A		Code N/A	
129. Highway-Rail Crossing Users		N/A		N/A		130. Highway Vehicle Property Damage (est. dollar damage)	
131. Total Number of Highway-Rail Crossing Users (include driver)		N/A		N/A		N/A	
132. Locomotive Auxiliary Lights? 1. Yes 2. No				Code N/A			
133. Locomotive Auxiliary Lights Operational? 1. Yes 2. No				Code N/A			
134. Locomotive Headlight Illuminated? 1. Yes 2. No				Code N/A			
135. Locomotive Audible Warning Sounded? 1. Yes 2. No				Code N/A			

136. DRAW A SKETCH OF ACCIDENT AREA INCLUDING ALL TRACKS, SIGNALS, SWITCHES, STRUCTURES, OBJECTS, ETC., INVOLVED.



137. SYNOPSIS OF THE ACCIDENT

Eastbound Union Pacific Railroad Company (UP) Unit Coal Train CBTLU9-05 derailed on March 6, 2008, at 11:54 p.m. CST. The accident occurred near the town of Fairfield, Nebraska at milepost (MP) 247.7 on the North Platte Service Unit, Marysville Subdivision. As a result of the accident 38 cars were derailed.

There were no injuries or hazardous material spilled as a result of the derailment. Total damages reported for the derailment totaled \$2,036,743.

At the time of the accident it was dark, cloudy, and snowing with a temperature of 19 °F.

The cause of the derailment has been determined to be the result of a broken insulated joint bar.

138. NARRATIVE

CIRCUMSTANCES PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT

The crew of UP Unit Coal Train CBTLU9-05 included a locomotive engineer and a conductor. They first went on duty at 6 p.m. CST March 6, 2008 at North Platte, Nebraska. This was the home terminal for both crewmembers and both had received more than the required statutory off-duty rest period prior to reporting for duty.

The assigned freight train consisted of 3 locomotives, 110 loaded cars and no empties. The train was 6,162 feet long and weighed 16,134 tons. The train was destined for Ladue, Missouri. The train received a Class I air brake test at North Platte on March 6, 2008. UP Unit Coal Train CBTLU9-05 is designated as an extended haul train. The train departed North Platte at 7:10 p.m. CST, March 6, 2008.

As the eastbound train approached the accident area the locomotive engineer was seated at the controls on the south side of the leading locomotive. The conductor was seated on the north side of the leading locomotive.

The track at, and leading up to the point of derailment (POD), is tangent and on a 0.26-degree descending grade. It is constructed of 133-pound Continuous Welded Rail (CWR) on concrete ties. At the POD there is an intermediate signal; no other track structures exist in the accident area.

THE ACCIDENT

UP Unit Coal Train CBTLU9-05 was being operated at 43 mph approaching the accident area and at the time of the derailment. Speeds were recorded by the event recorder of the controlling locomotive. The maximum authorized speed for the train is 50 mph as designated in the UP System Special Instructions speed restrictions for unit coal trains.

At 11:54 p.m. UP Unit Coal Train CBTLU9-05 was traveling eastward at milepost 247.7. The engineer was seated at the control stand and the conductor was seated at his normal position in the cab when a train line initiated emergency air brake application brought the head-end of the train to a stop at milepost 247. The accident resulted in the derailment of 38 cars including the 30th through the 67th head cars of the train. The weather was dark, cloudy, and snowing with a temperature of 19 °F. Visibility was unrestricted approaching the accident area.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

ANALYSIS - FRA TRACK INSPECTION:

FRA and Nebraska Public Service Commission (NPSC) personnel performed a post-accident track inspection.

CONCLUSION:

Inspection of the track in the accident area revealed the track to be in compliance with Federal regulations.

ANALYSIS - RAILROAD TRACK INSPECTION RECORDS AND WAYSIDE DETTCTORS:

The last ultrasonic rail detection test through this area was on March 5, 2008. No defects were noted in the accident area. The track was also inspected by hi-rail vehicle on March 5, 2008 with no exceptions noted in the derailment area. UP reported that the train defect detector located at milepost 260.2 produced no alarms for UP Unit Coal Train CBTLU9-05.

CONCLUSION:

No contributory conditions were disclosed by previous railroad track inspections or from track wayside detectors.

ANALYSIS - EQUIPMENT:

UP Staff inspected the non-derailed portion of the train. The UP Officials and FRA Investigators inspected the derailed portion of the train.

CONCLUSION:

No equipment was found having conditions which may have caused or contributed to the cause of the accident.

ANALYSIS - LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEER OPERATING PERFORMANCE:

The locomotive was equipped with an event recorder as required and an on-board camera. The relevant event recorder data was downloaded on site by the Director of Road Operations and analyzed by the UP Officials and FRA Personnel. The locomotive camera data was downloaded and sent to UP facilities in Omaha Nebraska for analysis.

CONCLUSION:

The locomotive engineer was in compliance with all applicable railroad operating and train handling requirements.

Analysis - FRA Post-Accident Toxicological Testing: Post-accident toxicology testing of the crew was conducted. UP officials determined that the accident was a "major" accident as defined by Federal regulations.

Conclusion: FRA Post-Accident Toxicological Result Reports indicates that the two employees tested had negative test results.

ANALYSIS - FATIGUE:

FRA obtained fatigue related information, for the 10-day period preceding this incident including the 10-day work history (on duty/off duty cycles) for all of the employees involved.

CONCLUSION:

Upon analysis of that information FRA concluded fatigue was not probable for any of the employees.

ANALYSIS - LAB ANALYSIS OF BROKEN RAIL:

Post-accident evaluation of the track components produced a broken insulated joint bar. One-half of an 8-hole insulated joint bar was found at the accident scene. Evidence of rail batter was noted on the rail head at the broken end of the joint bar. The broken joint bar and associated rail was shipped to the Rail Sciences, Inc. Laboratory in Omaha, Nebraska for further analysis.

CONCLUSION:

The following information is taken from the UP Derailment Track/Rail Report with Project History # 36-2008-013. "Based on the evidence received, the derailment was caused by broken insulated joint bars. The bars failed due to fatigue cracks which initiated on the top of the bars."

DISCUSSION:

"Both of the joint bars in the insulated joint contained areas of fatigue fracture initiating at the top of the bars. There is leaving end rail batter present at the top of the rail in the joint. There is an indication of movement of the joint bars relative to the rail of approximately 0.1 inch. In addition, the insulation in the insulated joint is stripped in several locations..." The lab report also states that the joint bar was manufactured in 2005.

OVERALL CONCLUSIONS:

The data reviewed from the event recorder ruled out train handling as a cause. There were no failed or defective mechanical components found in the accident area. Inspections of the equipment also revealed no suspect components. There was no grade and curvature in the area that would have contributed to the cause. Post-accident toxicology testing was performed with the results being negative.

All findings and post-accident analysis substantiates a broken insulated joint bar.

PROBABLE CAUSE AND CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

The FRA determined that the derailment was caused by a broken insulated joint bar.