

Federal Railroad Administration Office of Safety Headquarters Assigned Accident Investigation Report HQ-2007-45

Amtrak (ATK) Shafter, California July 19, 2007

Note that 49 U.S.C. §20903 provides that no part of an accident or incident report made by the Secretary of Transportation/Federal Railroad Administration under 49 U.S.C. §20902 may be used in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report.

FEDERAL RAILR					FRA FA	ACTUA	L RAI	LROAD A	CCID	ENT F	REPORT		I	FRA Fi	le#	HQ-200	<u>7-45</u>
1.Name of Railroad C	Operating	Train #1						1a. Alphabeti	c Code			lb. Ra	ailroad A	ccident	t/Inci	dent No.	
Amtrak [ATK]		ATK					105043										
2.Name of Railroad C N/A	perating	Train #2						2a. Alphabeti	c Code N/A		2	2b. Ra	o. Railroad Accident/Incident No. N/A				
3.Name of Railroad C N/A	Operating	g Train #3						3a. Alphabeti	c Code N/A			3b. Ra	o. Railroad Accident/Incident No. N/A				
4.Name of Railroad F BNSF Rwy Co. [BN	-	ble for Trac	k Main	tenano	ce:			4a. Alphabetic Code BNSF				4b. R	o. Railroad Accident/Incident No. CA0707201				
5. U.S. DOT_AAR G	rade Cro	ssing Ident	ificatio	n Nun		386G		6. Date of Ac Month 07	cident/I		ear 2007	7. Ti	ime of Accident/Incident 01:55: AM V PM				
8. Type of Accident/I	ndicent	1. Deraili	nent		4. Side co	ollision		7. Hwy-rail	crossing	10.	Explosion-d	etonat	tion 13.	Other			Code
(single entry in coo	de box)	2. Head of 3. Rear er			•	g collision		RR grade Obstruction	•		Fire/violent Other impac	•	re	(desci		n	07
9. Cars Carrying HAZMAT		10. HAZI Damaged	MAT C	ars		11. 0	Cars Relea	· ·	ing 12. Pe N/A Evacu		ole		13. Division 0 Bakersf				1
	0				N/A	15. Mile	enost										
14. Nearest City/Tow		Shafter				1	earest ter	nth) 14.4	10. Sta	6. State Abbr Code N/A CA			7. County KERN				
18. Temperature (F)		19. Visib	ility	(sing	le entry)	Code	20. We	eather (single	e entry)		Code		21. Typ	e of Tra	ick		Code
(specify if minus) 97	F		Dawn Day	3.Di 4.D		2	1. Clear 3. Rain 5.Sleet						1. Main 3. Siding 2. Yard 4. Industry 1			1	
22. Track Name/Nu	mber		Ma	ıin		23. FRA Class	Track s (1-9, X)	Code 5	(g	nual Trac ross tons illions)	ck Density in 55.46		25. Time Table Direction 1. North 3. East 2. South 4.			Code 4	
							OPER A	TING TRA			22.10	-		2. Sout	n 4.		
26. Type of Equipme	ent 1.	. Freight tra	in	4. Wo	ork train 7.	Yard/swi		A. Spec. Mo		p. Code	27. Was E	quipn	nent (ode	28.	Train Nun	nber/Symbo
Consist (single er	ntry) 2.	. Passenger			~	Light loc		•	•		Attend	ed? es 2	No.	1		ATK-7	15-19
29. Speed (recorded					of cars 9. Method(s) of			nter code(s)	that ar	1	1. 1		- 1		ontro	olled Loco	
R - Recorded	specu, n	avanabie)	Code		ATCS	-	. Automa		-	ial instru	ctions	- 1	0 = Not a				mouve.
E - Estimated	64	MPH	R		Auto train o				n. Othe	er than ma	ain track	- 1	1 = Remote control portable				
20 T-:::: T	(1	Auto train		Time tab	le/train orders					2 = Remo			ower	
30. Trailing Tons (excluding power					Cab Traffic	j.Track warrant control p. Other (Specify in narrative) k. Direct traffic control Code(s)					ve)	3 = Remote control transmitter - more than one remote control transmitter					
		. 0			Interlocking	,	Yard limi		e	N/A N							0
32. Principal Car/Unit	t	a. Initial a	and Nur	nber	b. Positio	n in Train	c. Lo	oaded(yes/no)	_		employee(s)				ol use		
 First involved (derailed, struck, e 	etc)	CD'	ГХ2012	2	:	1		yes	yes enter the number that the appropriate box.					П	-	Alcohol N/A	Drugs N/A
(2) Causing (if med	chanical	1	0			0	N/A 34. Was this consist transporting passenge						gers? (Y/N)	11/11	Y	
35. Locomotive Unit		a. Head		Mid T	rain		Rear End 36. Cars Load . Manual c. Remote a. Freight 1					1			e. Caboose		
(1) Total in Train	n	End 1	b. Man		c. Remote	0. Manuai	c. Rem		in Equi	pment Co		_	0. Pass. 4	c. Fre		0. Pass.	e. Caboose
(2) Total Deraile	d	1	0	,	0	0	0	(2) Total	Deraile	:d	0	,	4	0	,	0	0
37. Equipment Dama				_	ck, Signal, V			20 Prim									
This Consist		217500			Structure Da	-	258000	Code	ary Cau	se 	M308		40. Cont Code	ributing	g Cau		1303
		Number									Lengtl	of T	ime on D	•			
41. Engineer/	42. Fir	remen	4	13. Co	nductors	44. Bra	ıkemen	45. Engi		erator			46. Con		,	2	M; =
Operators 1		0			1	1	1	Hrs ₂ Mi ₅					Hrs 2 Mi 5				
Casualties to:	47. Railı	road Emplo	yees 48	3. Trai	n Passenger	s 49. C	Other	50. EOT Device?					51. Was EOT Device Properly Armed?				
Fatal		0			0		0	1. Yes 2. No 2 52. Caboose Occupied by Crew?					1. Yes 2. No N/A				
Nonfatal		2			0		0	1. Yes 2. No N/A									
						OI	PERATI	ING TRAIN	I #2								
53. Type of Equipme Consist (single en	try) 2.	Freight tra Passenger	train 5	5. Sing	gle car 8.	Yard/swit Light loco	-	A. Spec. Mo	W Equip	o. Code	54. Was Ed Attende		ent C	ode	55. T		ber/Symbol
	3.	Commuter				Maint./ins	<u>. </u>			N/A	1. Ye	es 2.	. 110	N/A		N/	
56. Speed (recorded	speed, if	available)	Code	1	Method(s)	•		nter code(s)						-		olled Loco	motive?
R - Recorded E - Estimated	0	МРН	N/A		ATCS Auto train o	_	. Automa . Current		-	cial instru er than ma		- 1	0 = Not a 1 = Rem				

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
					FRA FA	ACTUA	L RAILR	OAD AC	CIDENT REP	ORT	F	RA File#	HQ-200	<u>7-45</u>	
		ge,		d. e.	Cab Traffic	j.' k.	Frack warran Direct traffi	t control F	O. Other (Specify in Code(s)	narrative)	3 = Remo	te control ote control ter - more ontrol tran	than one	N/A	
59. Principal Car/Uni	it	a. Initial	and N	Number	b. Positi	on in Trair	c. Load	led(yes/no)					ise,		
(1) First involved (derailed, struck,	etc)		0			0	1	N/A	Alcohol Drugs N/A N/A						
- \		1	0			0		N/A	61. Was this cons	ist transport	ting passengers? (Y/N)				
62. Locomotive Uni	ts	a. Head End	b. M		rain c. Remote			63. Cars		a. Freight	aded b. Pass.	En c. Freight	npty d. Pass.	e. Caboose	
(1) Total in Train	ı	0		0	0	0	0	(1) Total in	Equipment Consist	0	0	0	0	0	
(2) Total Deraile	d	0		0	0	0	0	(2) Total D	erailed	0		0	0	0	
	ige	0			_		0	1	•			ributing Ca	iuse		
This Consist			r of C			ımage		Code			Code			N/A	
0			73. Con	ductor											
Operators 0									-	ii 0		Hrs	· ·	Mi 0	
Casualties to:	74. Rail	road Emplo	oyees	75. Trai	n Passenger	rs 76. Oth	ner						ce Properly Armed? 2. No N/A		
Fatal		0			0		0					1. Yes 2. No			
Nonfatal					0			79. Caboo							
Nomatai		0			U	0		G TRAIN		2. No				N/A	
80. Type of Equipme	nt 1.	Freight tra	in	4. Wot	k train 7.					Was Equipn	nent Co	ode 82.	Train Nun	nber/Symbol	
	try) 2.	Passenger	train	5. Sing	gle car 8.	Light loco	o(s).	~F		Attended?	LN	I/A	N/A	·	
83. Speed (recorded)							•	r code(s) th	at apply)		1	otely Contr	olled Loco	motive?	
R - Recorded				a	ATCS	g.	Automatic b	nock	-		0 = Not a	remotely o	ontrolled		
E - Estimated	N/A	MPH	0				Current of t	Tame 1 = Remote control portable							
84. Trailing Tons (gross to	ınage,						t control F	o. Other (Specify in	narrative)		te control	lower		
excluding power	r units)									ĺ		ter - more			
		0		f.	Interlocking	g 1.`	Yard limits		N/A N/A N/A	N/A N/A	remote c	ontrol tran	smitter	N/A	
86. Principal Car/Uni	it	a. Initial	and N	Number	b. Positi	on in Trair	c. Load	led(yes/no)			_	•	se,		
` '	etc)		0			0		N/A			e positive in Alcohol Drugs N/A N/A				
		1	0			0		N/A	88. Was this cons	ist transport	ting passengers? (Y/N)				
					<u> </u>		<u> </u>	ı			1.1			 	
89. Locomotive Uni	ts		b. M		I			90. Cars		a. Freight	b. Pass.	c. Freight	d. Pass.	e. Caboose	
(1) Total in Train	ı	0		0	0	0	0	(1) Total in	Equipment Consist	0	0	0	0	0	
(2) Total Deraile	d	0		0	0	0	0	(2) Total D	erailed	0	0	0	0	0	
	ige			92. Tra	ck, Signal,	Way,		93. Primar	•			ributing Ca	use		
This Consist						ımage	0				Code			N/A	
O5 Engineer/	06 Ein		rorc			08 Bra	kemen	99 Engine	er/Operator	Length of	11me on D				
	90. FII			77.0		70. Dia			•	i 0	100. Coi	Hrs	0	Mi 0	
Casualties to:	101. Rai	ilroad Emp	loyee	s 102.	Гrain	103. O	ther						ice Proper	ly	
Fatal		0			0	0				N/A	1.	Yes	2. No	N/A	
Nonfatal		0			0		0			2. No				N/A	
		Highw	ay Us	ser Invo	olved					Equipmen	t Involved	i			
107.	railer	F Rue		I Other	Motor Vah	icle	Code	111. Equip		(etandine)	6.Light	Loco(s) (-	novina)	Code	
A. Auto D. Pick-Up	Truck	G. School	Bus	K. Pedes			C	3.Train (standing) 1.Train(units pulling) 4.Car(s) (moving) 7.Light(s) (standing) 2.Train(units pushing) 5.Car(s) (standing) 8.Other (specify in narrative)							
B. Truck E. Van 108. Vehicle Speed			109.	wi. Othe	geographi		Code		on of Car Unit in	(standing)	o.Other	(specify in	narrative)	1 -	
(est. MPH at in	npact)	0		rth 2.Sc	geograpm outh 3.East		4	112.103111	on on our our in		1				

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	ENT OF TRAI RAILROAD AD			FRAF	FACTU	AL RAILR	OAD AC	CIDE	NT F	REPORT	F	FRA File # <u>HQ-2007</u>	<u>-45</u>
110. Position						Code	113. Circu	mstance					Code
1.Stalled o	on Crossing 2.Sto	opped o	n Crossing	3.Moving Ov	er Crossin	g 1				k Highway User k by Highway User	r		1
114a. Was the	e highway user a	nd/or ra	il equipment	involved		Code	114h W:	as there a	hazar	dous materials rele	ase		Code
in the impact transporting hazardous materials?											1 .		
1. Highway User 2. Rail Equipment 3. Both 4. Neither 4 1. Highway User 2. Rail Equipment 3. Both 4. Neither											4		
114c. State he	ere the name and	quantity	y of the haza	rdous materia	als released	d, if any. N/A							
115. Type	1.Gates	4.W	ig Wags	7.Cros	ssbucks	10.Flagged by	crew	116. Sig	naled	Crossing	Code	117. Whistle	Code
Crossing 2.Cantilever FLS 5.Hwy. traffic signals 8.Stop signs 11.Other (spec. in narr.) (See instructions for codes) 1. Yes Warning 3.Standard FLS 6.Audible 9.Watchman 12.None 2. No													
Code(s)	05	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A			3. Unknown	2		
118. Location of Warning Code 119. Crossing Warning Code 120. Crossing Illuminated by Street 1. Both Sides with Highway Signals Lights or Special Lights										Code			
2. Side of Vehicle Approach 1. Yes								1. Yes					
3. Opposite Side of Vehicle Approach						2. No 3. Unknown			2	2. No 3. Unkno		2	
121. Age	122. Driver's G	ender				or in Front of	Code	ode 124. Driver 1. Drove around or thru the Gate 4. Stopped on Crossins					
Age	1. Male			1. Yes	2. No	3. Unknowr							
39	39 2. Female 1. Yes 2. No 3. Unknown 2. Stopped a 3. Did not St						ot Stop	4					
125. Driver Pa	issed	Code	e 126. Vie	w of Track O	bscured by	y (primary ob	struction)						Code
Highway V	ehicle	1		ermanent Str			ng Train 5.				ecify in n	narrative)	1
1. Yes 2. No	3. Unknown	2	2. S	tanding Railr	oad Equip	ment 4. Topo	graphy 6.	Highway	Vehic	le 8. Not obstruc	cted		8
Casualties	to:		Killed	Injured	127. Dri 1. Kille	iver ed 2.Injured 3.	Uninjured					ne Vehicle? 2. No	Code
129. Highway-Rail Crossing Users 0 0						ghway Vehicle t. dollar damaş		amage 0 131. Total Number of Highway-Rail Crossi (include driver) 1					
132. Locomot	ive Auxiliary Lig	ghts?				Code	133. Locor	motive A	uxiliar	y Lights Operation	nal?		Code
1. Y	'es	2. 1	No			1	1.	1. Yes 2. No					
134. Locomot	ive Headlight Illı	uminate	d?			Code	135. Locor	motive A	udible	Warning Sounded	!?		Code
1. Y	'es	2. 1	No			1	1.	Yes		2. No			1

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136. DRAW A SKETCH OF ACCIDENT AREA INCLUDING ALL TRACKS, SIGNALS, SWITCHES, STRUCTURES, OBJECTS, ETC., INVOLVED.



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137. SYNOPSIS OF THE ACCIDENT

At 1:55p.m. PDT, July 19, 2007, westbound Amtrak (ATK) passenger train 715-19, operating in a locomotive forward configuration, struck the water tanker of a truck/trailer combination, which was stopped foul of the track at a public highway-rail grade crossing. The accident occurred in Shafter, California, milepost 904.4, DOT/AAR crossing number 023386G on the BNSF Railway (BNSF), California Division, Bakersfield Subdivision.

The method of operation is Traffic Control System. The maximum timetable speed is 79 mph for passenger trains and 70 mph for freight trains. A total of 156 passengers were aboard at the time of the accident

The Amtrak locomotive engineer sustained a minor injury and a service employee later complained of pain and sought medical treatment. There were no hazardous materials involved. Estimated equipment damage is \$217,000; estimated track and signal damage is \$258,000. The truck driver was not injured, however, the water tanker trailer was destroyed.

At the time of the accident, it was daylight and clear with a temperature of 97 degrees Fahrenheit.

The accident was caused by the failure of the tanker truck driver to pull the entire length of his vehicle clear of the railroad track before stopping.

138. NARRATIVE

Circumstances Prior to the Accident

The crew of Amtrak Train 715-19 West included a locomotive engineer, a conductor and an assistant conductor. The three man crew was called to report for duty at 11:20 a.m. on July 19, 2007, at their "away from home" duty station at Bakersfield, California. The crew had received the required statutory off duty period prior to reporting for duty.

Their assigned passenger train consisted of one locomotive and four cars and was being operated in a locomotive forward mode. The train ran on a scheduled route beginning at Bakersfield and terminating at Oakland, California. The trip was uneventful and a normal run prior to approaching the accident area..

As the train approached the accident area, the locomotive engineer was seated at the controls at the right side of the locomotive, CDTX 2012. The conductor was in the rear car of the train processing his paper work and the assistant conductor was in the second car from the head end arranging passengers for the pending stop at Wasco, California.

The railroad timetable direction of travel is westward; but is geographically northwest. The geographical direction of travel of the motor vehicle was westward. Timetable directions are used throughout this report in reference to the train movement. It should be noted that the vehicle crossed in front of the locomotive in a geographically westward direction, that is from right to left. In this area, the track is tangent and on a descending grade of less than 0.5 percent between milepost 903 and milepost 905.

The maximum authorized speed for this train was 79 mph, as designated in the current BNSF Timetable.

The Accident

Amtrak Train 715-19 West

As the train approached the Los Angeles Avenue public grade crossing, the engineer stated that the train was traveling at 79 mph and that he was sounding the train horn. He stated that he saw the tanker truck move slowly across the tracks, then stop before the trailer was clear of the main track. Investigation has developed that the truck had stopped at the stop sign that protects Santa Fe Avenue. Santa Fe Avenue runs parallel with and along the west side of the BNSF trackage. When the engineer determined that the truck was not going to pull the trailer clear of the main track and that an impact was imminent, he placed the train in emergency braking, left the engineer's seat and placed himself on the floor of the locomotive cab. Seconds later, the train struck the stopped empty water trailer which was fouling the track.

Water Tanker Truck and Trailer (empty)

The investigation revealed that the truck moved slowly in a westward direction across the tracks and stopped at the stop sign, which is located just west of the BNSF trackage at Santa Fe Avenue. Santa Fe Avenue is a heavily traveled highway

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that runs parallel to the BNSF tracks.

When the driver of the truck stopped his vehicle at the stop sign and waited for on-coming vehicle traffic on Santa Fe Avenue to clear, he was unaware that the water tanker trailer of his truck and trailer was not clear of the railroad tracks behind him. The driver stated that as he waited for traffic to clear, he heard the crossing bells begin, and the sound of the train horn as the train approached. The train struck the left side of the empty water tanker trailer at a point near the rear wheels of the trailer. At impact, the trailer was shoved towards the west side of the train and stopped approximately 100 feet from the point of impact. The locomotive and all four cars of the Amtrak train derailed but remained upright and stopped in approximately one-quarter of a mile.

Post-Accident Investigation

After the train stopped, the conductor had a short radio conversation with the engineer, then notified the train dispatcher. Emergency personnel from the surrounding area were dispatched to the scene. The conductor and the assistant conductor surveyed the passengers and determined that none were injured. The driver of the truck, a 39-year old male, was not injured and there were no passengers in the vehicle. The locomotive engineer was removed from the scene and taken by ambulance to the Bakersfield Memorial Hospital where he was treated for neck and back pain and released. A service employee later complained of pain and sought medical treatment. All 156 passengers were removed from the train and were staged at a local youth center until buses arrived.

The grade crossing is a heavily traveled paved two lane road that crosses one main track, one siding track and two additional tracks at a 90-degree angle to the west. Vehicles travel in an east/west direction. For westward vehicle traffic, the warning system consists of a standard five-inch mast mounted at the edge of the approaching lane. Two 8-inch flashing light units, a gate arm, a crossbuck, and an audible warning bell are mounted on the mast. Three Harmon Crossing Processors and Phase Motion Detectors provide train detection on an approach circuit sufficient to allow at least twenty-five seconds warning time for train movements. A review of all records, tests and inspections on the signals and grade crossing warning devices indicate the system functioned as intended and did not contribute to the accident.

Analysis and Conclusions

Analysis

The signals and grade crossing warning devices functioned as intended and did not contribute to the accident.

A review of all records, tests and inspections on the Amtrak locomotive indicate it did not contribute to the accident. The locomotive was equipped with front headlights, auxiliary lights and the audible warning devices required by Federal regulations. The auxiliary lights were broken from the impact.

A review of the locomotive event recorder indicates the train was traveling at a recorded speed of 64 mph immediately prior to or at impact. The review also concluded that the locomotive engineer's handling of the train did not contribute to the accident.

Conclusion

The Amtrak train and BNSF grade crossing protection were in compliance with their operating rules and applicable Federal standards.

The truck driver misjudged the length of his vehicle and failed to completely clear the crossing prior to stopping.

Probable Cause

FRA has determined the accident was caused by the failure of the tanker truck driver to pull the entire length of his vehicle clear of the railroad track before stopping.

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