



***Federal Railroad Administration  
Office of Safety  
Headquarters Assigned  
Accident Investigation Report  
HQ-2006-54***

***CSX Transportation  
Baltimore, MD  
June 25, 2006***


***Note that 49 U.S.C. §20903 provides that no part of an accident or incident report made by the Secretary of Transportation/Federal Railroad Administration under 49 U.S.C. §20902 may be used in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report.***



DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION		FRA FACTUAL RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT				FRA File # <u>HQ-2006-54</u>	
56. Trailing Tons (gross tonnage, excluding power units)  12053		c. Auto train stop d. Cab e. Traffic f. Interlocking		i. Time table/train orders j. Track warrant control k. Direct traffic control l. Yard limits		o. Positive train control p. Other (Specify in narrative) Code(s) e   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A	
						2 = Remote control tower 3 = Remote control transmitter - more than one remote control transmitter 0	
58. Principal Car/Unit		a. Initial and Number		b. Position in Train		c. Loaded(yes/no)	
(1) First involved (derailed, struck, etc)		SIRX52 5222		126		no	
(2) Causing (if mechanical cause reported)		0		N/A		N/A	
						59. If railroad employee(s) tested for drug/alcohol use, enter the number that were positive in the appropriate box.	
						Alcohol   Drugs N/A   N/A	
						60. Was this consist transporting passengers? (Y/N) N	
61. Locomotive Units		a. Head End		Mid Train b. Manual   c. Remote		Rear End d. Manual   c. Remote	
(1) Total in Train		3		0   0		0   0	
(2) Total Derailed		0		0   0		0   0	
63. Equipment Damage This Consist		50194		64. Track, Signal, Way, & Structure Damage		0	
						65. Primary Cause Code   H221	
						66. Contributing Cause Code   N/A	
						Length of Time on Duty	
67. Engineer/Operators   1		68. Firemen N/A		69. Conductors 1		70. Brakemen N/A	
						71. Engineer/Operator Hrs   2   Mi   57	
						72. Conductor Hrs   2   Mi   57	
Casualties to:		73. Railroad Employees		74. Train Passengers		75. Other	
Fatal		0		0		0	
Nonfatal		0		0		0	
						76. EOT Device? 1. Yes   2. No   1	
						77. Was EOT Device Properly Armed? 1. Yes   2. No   1	
						78. Caboose Occupied by Crew? 1. Yes   2. No   2	
Highway User Involved				Rail Equipment Involved			
79. Type C. Truck-Trailer   F. Bus   J. Other Motor Vehicle   Code A. Auto   D. Pick-Up Truck   G. School Bus   K. Pedestrian B. Truck   E. Van   H. Motorcycle   M. Other (spec. in narrative)   N/A				83. Equipment 3. Train (standing)   6. Light Loco(s) (moving)   Code 1. Train(units pulling)   4. Car(s)(moving)   7. Light(s) (standing) 2. Train(units pushing)   5. Car(s)(standing)   8. Other (specify in narrative)   N/A			
80. Vehicle Speed (est. MPH at impact)   0				81. Direction (geographical) 1. North   2. South   3. East   4. West   N/A			
82. Position 1. Stalled on Crossing   2. Stopped on Crossing   3. Moving Over Crossing 4. Trapped   N/A				84. Position of Car Unit in Train 0			
82a. Was the highway user and/or rail equipment involved in the impact transporting hazardous materials? 1. Highway User   2. Rail Equipment   3. Both   4. Neither   N/A				85. Circumstance 1. Rail Equipment Struck Highway User 2. Rail Equipment Struck by Highway User   N/A			
				86b. Was there a hazardous materials release by 1. Highway User   2. Rail Equipment   3. Both   4. Neither   N/A			
86c. State here the name and quantity of the hazardous materials released, if any. N/A							
87. Type of Crossing Warning		1. Gates   4. Wig Wags   7. Crossbucks   10. Flagged by crew 2. Cantilever FLS   5. Hwy. traffic signals   8. Stop signs   11. Other (spec. in narr.) 3. Standard FLS   6. Audible   9. Watchman   12. None		88. Signaled Crossing Warning (See instructions for codes)		89. Whistle Ban 1. Yes   2. No   3. Unknown   N/A	
Code(s)   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A							
90. Location of Warning 1. Both Sides 2. Side of Vehicle Approach 3. Opposite Side of Vehicle Approach   N/A		Code		91. Crossing Warning Interconnected with Highway Signals 1. Yes   2. No   3. Unknown   N/A		Code	
						92. Crossing Illuminated by Street Lights or Special Lights 1. Yes   2. No   3. Unknown   N/A	
93. Driver's Age 0		94. Driver's Gender 1. Male   2. Female   N/A		Code		95. Driver Drove Behind or in Front of Train and Struck or was Struck by Second Train 1. Yes   2. No   3. Unknown   N/A	
						96. Driver 1. Drove around or thru the Gate   4. Stopped on Crossing 2. Stopped and then Proceeded   5. Other (specify in narrative) 3. Did not Stop   N/A	
97. Driver Passed Standing Highway Vehicle 1. Yes   2. No   3. Unknown   N/A		Code		98. View of Track Obscured by (primary obstruction) 1. Permanent Structure   3. Passing Train   5. Vegetation   7. Other (specify in narrative) 2. Standing Railroad Equipment   4. Topography   6. Highway Vehicle   8. Not obstructed   N/A		Code	
101. Casualties to Highway-Rail Crossing Users		Killed   Injured		99. Driver Was 1. Killed   2. Injured   3. Uninjured   N/A		Code	
		0   0		102. Highway Vehicle Property Damage (est. dollar damage)   0		100. Was Driver in the Vehicle? 1. Yes   2. No   N/A	
						103. Total Number of Highway-Rail Crossing Users (include driver)   0	
104. Locomotive Auxiliary Lights? 1. Yes   2. No   N/A		Code		105. Locomotive Auxiliary Lights Operational? 1. Yes   2. No   N/A		Code	
106. Locomotive Headlight Illuminated? 1. Yes   2. No   N/A		Code		107. Locomotive Audible Warning Sounded? 1. Yes   2. No   N/A		Code	

108. DRAW A SKETCH OF ACCIDENT AREA INCLUDING ALL TRACKS, SIGNALS, SWITCHES, STRUCTURES, OBJECTS, ETC., INVOLVED.

SKETCH  
HQ-2006-  
54.jpg



#### 109. SYNOPSIS OF THE ACCIDENT

K-277-23, a westbound CSX freight train struck the rear of standing train, CSX, Q-409-24, on June 26, 2006 at 08:13 a.m. The impact occurred in Van Bibber, MD, at MP BAK 070.51, located at the east end of Van Bibber siding on the Philadelphia Subdivision of the Baltimore division.

At this time there are no reported injuries. The three rear end cars of standing train, Q-409-24 and the lead locomotive of K-277-23 derailed. The estimated cost of the accident is \$71,000. The temperature at the time of the derailment was approximately 77 degrees Fahrenheit and raining.

The probable cause of the accident is failing to comply with a stop signal indication. The crew was tested under reasonable cause testing.

#### 110. NARRATIVE

##### CIRCUMSTANCES PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT

The train crew that was operating CSX train K277-23 at the time of the collision consisted of a locomotive engineer and conductor. Their initial on duty time was 12:30 a.m., EST, June 25, 2006, at CSX Bay View yard in Baltimore, MD. Baltimore Terminal is the home terminal for both employees. Both the locomotive engineer and conductor received more than the statutory off duty period, prior to reporting for duty.

The train crew was called to operate CSX Train Q406-24 from Baltimore, MD to Philadelphia, PA. After reporting for duty, the crew was relieved from assignment Q406-24 and instructed to operate train K650-23 because it was a higher priority train. They departed Bay View Yard at 1:30 A.M.

The crew arrived at 58th street in Philadelphia, PA at 5:20 A.M. The crew was then instructed to operate CSX Train K277-23 back to Baltimore, MD. CSX westbound freight train K277-23 consisted of 2 locomotives, 71 loads and 2 empties cars consisting of mixed freight. The train was 6,800 feet in length and consisted of 6,794 trailing tons. A class one brake test was performed on 6/22/06 on the train. The crew departed on train K277-23 from Philadelphia at 6:10 a.m.

The railroad timetable direction of the train is west. Timetable direction will be used throughout the report.

As the westbound K277-23 approached the accident area, the locomotive engineer was seated at the control on the north side of the locomotive. The conductor was seated on the south side of the locomotive.

Traversing west on the single track mainline there are in succession a 2 degree 15 minute curve to the right for 1700 feet, a tangent segment of track, 600 feet in length, a 2 degree 15 minute curve to the left for 1950 feet in length, a tangent segment of 800 feet in length, continuing through a right hand turnout into the siding, then onto a tangent segment of track 1925 feet in length to the point of collision. The grade approaching the accident area is 0.75% descending westward.

The view for the westbound train K277-23 approaching the collision point with the end of train Q409-24 was approximately 2150 feet and unrestricted.

##### THE ACCIDENT

The accident occurred at the east end of Van-Bibber siding on the Philadelphia subdivision of the Baltimore division. The head end of Q409-24 was at the west end of Van-Bibber siding.

The westbound train, K-277-23 with lead locomotive CSX 5283, was operating at a recorded speed of 48 miles per hour approaching the accident area. The speed was recorded, when the locomotives passed the approach signal at Bel-Camp. These speeds were verified by the locomotive's event recorder.

The maximum authorized speed for trains on this segment of track is 50 miles per hour, as designated in the current CSX timetable number 5.

Maximum authorized speed for trains operating over a segment of track governed by an "Approach Signal" is reduced to 35 mph (crews must immediately reduce their train speed to 35 mph and operate their train prepared to stop at the next signal).

given an approach signal.

They proceeded to travel approximately one mile and a half and then rounded a right-hand curve. There the stop signal located on the right of the track at the west end of Van-Bibber, became visible. The engineer immediately initiated an emergency brake application.

The locomotive was traveling at a speed of 48 mile per hour when the emergency brake application was initiated. The engineer stated that the signal was approximately 1,500 feet past the curve.

Westbound train, Q409-24 with lead locomotive CSX 8237 was stopped in the siding at Van-Bibber, which is located at milepost BAK 070.51, at the time of the collision.

Both crew members remained in their respective positions during the accident. The conductor stated that because of his training, he did not consider jumping from the locomotive because he knew that the locomotive was the safest place.

At the point of impact, K277-23 was traveling at a recorded speed of sixteen (16) miles per hour.

The collision occurred on the east end of the Van-Bibber siding located at mile post BAK 070.51. The collision caused the lead unit of K277-23 to derail but remain in an upright / cross-way position. The rear three cars on the Q409-24 derailed. The rear car SIRX 525222 was empty and remained upright. RBOX 34871 was loaded and remained in an upright position, and SIRX 490189 was empty and remained in an upright position.

Neither of the crew-members required medical attention and were transported to their home duty terminal.

#### ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

Post accident toxicological tests were performed on both crewmembers. All tests returned with negative result. The CSX signal department performed signal tests. It was determined that all signals were working properly.

The locomotive download and the interview from the crew revealed critical evidence to the cause of the accident. The crew on k277-23 violated Federal Regulation and Railroad Operating Rules.

#### PROBABLE CAUSE AND CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

The train crew failed to comply with the stop signal, displayed at Van-Bibber, as required by CSX operating rules. The train crew's failure to comply with the approach signal, prior to the stop signal, was a contributing factor.